Russia and Moldova are exploring a possible settlement of the
Transnistria conflict on a bilateral basis, outside the international 5
+ 2 format. Russia is the initiator of this approach, pulling a
reluctant but still hopeful Moldova along.
The Russian-desired outcome would: reunify Moldova nominally, albeit
under Russian oversight; show that Russia can single-handedly settle a
frozen” conflict in Europes East, marginalizing the Euro-Atlantic
community in the EUs own neighborhood; and demonstrate that countries
such as Moldova that do not seek to join NATO can hope for a more
lenient Russian treatment, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, which Russia
threatens to dismember or partition if they progress toward NATO
membership.
For its part, the Moldovan leadership pursues the twin goals of
reunifying Transnistria with the rest of the country and winning the
upcoming general elections in the spring of 2009. Commitment to
reunification of the state is a defining policy of the Vladimir Voronin
presidency (unlike the two predecessor leaderships). The president is
now completing his second, final term of office. Constitutionally
barred from seeking reelection, Voronin seeks instead a place in
history as the re-unifier of the country and also to ensure his partys
(communist in nothing more than name) continuity in power. To couple
the countrys reunification with the partys electoral calendar and
power-retention strategy, however, is to risk compromising both goals,
to Moscows benefit.
Moscow is capitalizing on Chisinaus impatience, lack of Western
initiatives on Transnistria and other conflicts, and the fright-effect
of Russias invasion of Georgia. Although Moldova does not border on
Russia and is therefore not exposed to military strikes, the Moldovan
leadership has drawn its political conclusions from the Wests
incapacity to deal with Russias war on Georgia.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held talks with Voronin in Sochi on
August 25 and with Transnistrias leader Igor Smirnov in Moscow on
September 3. In those meetings, a new negotiating process was planned
(Interfax, Moldpres, August 25-26, September 3-4).
The brunt of negotiations would shift from the 5+2 format (Russia,
Ukraine, OSCE, the United States, European Union, the Chisinau
government, and Tiraspol authorities) into a new, 1+2 format (Russia,
Chisinau, Tiraspol). The new process would exclude the West while
leaving Chisinau isolated to face Moscow and Tiraspol.
The process would begin with Chisinau-Tiraspol meetings at the level of
experts; continue with a Voronin-Smirnov meeting, possibly with an
official Russia-Moldova-Transnistria meeting; and culminate in a
Medvedev-Voronin-Smirnov meeting for signing the conflict-settlement
documents. Russia would act as facilitator at all stages and become the
guarantor of a final settlement, if achieved. Almost certainly, Russia
would insist on retaining a military presence as guarantor” of that
settlement.
The object of negotiations would no longer be Chisinaus 2007 package”
proposals, which Moldovas Western partners endorsed and which Russia
sidestepped but never rejected. Instead, some kind of synthesis would
be attempted with the package” and earlier proposals, including
elements” of Moscows infamous 2003 Kozak plan, as well as some new
Russian contributions (narabotki”).
Russia seeks a settlement that would confer to Tiraspol, i.e., to
Moscow through its Tiraspol proxies, effective blocking powers against
the policies of a reunified Moldovan state in the future. To that end,
Russia will again seek to amend Moldovas constitution and legislation,
introduce numerical overrepresentation of deputies from Transnistria in
a reunified Moldovan parliament, and enable Tiraspol authorities (under
a new constitutional dispensation) to stop Moldova from harmonizing its
legislative framework and policies with those of the European Union.
Moscow and Tiraspol also seem set to pressure Chisinau through
pro-Russia leaders in the Gagauz autonomous territory. Those local
leaders demand a status equivalent to Transnistrias within Moldova,
should it come to reunification under Russias auspices. On September
22 the Gagauz territorys legislative assembly narrowly approved a
resolution recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and praising Russias
recent actions in Georgia (Basapres, September 22, 23).
Chisinau easily concedes to Russias demand that Moldova should remain
permanently neutral, assuming that this implies maintaining a clear
distance from NATO. Indeed neither Moldova nor NATO can see valid
reasons for Moldovan membership in the alliance in any foreseeable
future. Russian representatives, however, told Moldovans in recent
contacts that the European Union was not merely an economic and
political union, but also potentially a political-military bloc, and
that Moldovas goal of accession to the EU would be incompatible with
Moldovas neutrality.
Within the moribund 5+2 format, and despite its agony, all sides say
that it remains the only legitimate forum for negotiation and decision.
But they attach differing meanings to this phrase. The Western
representatives, Ukraine, and Moldova take the position that only the
5+2 format can produce a legitimate outcome. Russia takes the position
that any format, including 1+2, can be considered legitimate if it
produces a solution mutually acceptable to the parties” (Moldova and
Russia/Transnistria), i.e., if Moldova is cajoled or pressured into it.
At the same time, Russia and, again, Moldova consider it possible to
reach a political settlement directly in the 1+2 format and then refer
it afterward to the 5+2 format for Western blessings (perhaps with
minor editing) there.
Chisinau seems caught between these two interpretations at the moment.
It is pressed for time and has lost its earlier confidence in a
Western-delivered solution.
The United States and EU recommend patience and postponement of a
solution until a more favorable context develops, both internationally
and locally. In the aftermath of Russias war on Georgia, however, it
seems difficult to persuade Chisinau that a favorable context can be
created any time soon. And it seems correspondingly difficult for
Chisinau to avoid the temptation of the Moscow-laid, 2+1 trap.
More than a decade ago, Moldovas then-presidents Mircea Snegur and
Petru Lucinschi embarked on appeasement of Russia in Transnistria after
seeing the West leaving Georgia face-to-face with Russia in Abkhazia.
As Snegur told this author at the time, If [Georgian] President
Shevardnadze with all his great diplomacy was not helped to retrieve
Abkhazia, what can a Moldovan president do about Transnistria?
under Russian oversight; show that Russia can single-handedly settle a
frozen” conflict in Europes East, marginalizing the Euro-Atlantic
community in the EUs own neighborhood; and demonstrate that countries
such as Moldova that do not seek to join NATO can hope for a more
lenient Russian treatment, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, which Russia
threatens to dismember or partition if they progress toward NATO
membership.
For its part, the Moldovan leadership pursues the twin goals of
reunifying Transnistria with the rest of the country and winning the
upcoming general elections in the spring of 2009. Commitment to
reunification of the state is a defining policy of the Vladimir Voronin
presidency (unlike the two predecessor leaderships). The president is
now completing his second, final term of office. Constitutionally
barred from seeking reelection, Voronin seeks instead a place in
history as the re-unifier of the country and also to ensure his partys
(communist in nothing more than name) continuity in power. To couple
the countrys reunification with the partys electoral calendar and
power-retention strategy, however, is to risk compromising both goals,
to Moscows benefit.
Moscow is capitalizing on Chisinaus impatience, lack of Western
initiatives on Transnistria and other conflicts, and the fright-effect
of Russias invasion of Georgia. Although Moldova does not border on
Russia and is therefore not exposed to military strikes, the Moldovan
leadership has drawn its political conclusions from the Wests
incapacity to deal with Russias war on Georgia.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held talks with Voronin in Sochi on
August 25 and with Transnistrias leader Igor Smirnov in Moscow on
September 3. In those meetings, a new negotiating process was planned
(Interfax, Moldpres, August 25-26, September 3-4).
The brunt of negotiations would shift from the 5+2 format (Russia,
Ukraine, OSCE, the United States, European Union, the Chisinau
government, and Tiraspol authorities) into a new, 1+2 format (Russia,
Chisinau, Tiraspol). The new process would exclude the West while
leaving Chisinau isolated to face Moscow and Tiraspol.
The process would begin with Chisinau-Tiraspol meetings at the level of
experts; continue with a Voronin-Smirnov meeting, possibly with an
official Russia-Moldova-Transnistria meeting; and culminate in a
Medvedev-Voronin-Smirnov meeting for signing the conflict-settlement
documents. Russia would act as facilitator at all stages and become the
guarantor of a final settlement, if achieved. Almost certainly, Russia
would insist on retaining a military presence as guarantor” of that
settlement.
The object of negotiations would no longer be Chisinaus 2007 package”
proposals, which Moldovas Western partners endorsed and which Russia
sidestepped but never rejected. Instead, some kind of synthesis would
be attempted with the package” and earlier proposals, including
elements” of Moscows infamous 2003 Kozak plan, as well as some new
Russian contributions (narabotki”).
Russia seeks a settlement that would confer to Tiraspol, i.e., to
Moscow through its Tiraspol proxies, effective blocking powers against
the policies of a reunified Moldovan state in the future. To that end,
Russia will again seek to amend Moldovas constitution and legislation,
introduce numerical overrepresentation of deputies from Transnistria in
a reunified Moldovan parliament, and enable Tiraspol authorities (under
a new constitutional dispensation) to stop Moldova from harmonizing its
legislative framework and policies with those of the European Union.
Moscow and Tiraspol also seem set to pressure Chisinau through
pro-Russia leaders in the Gagauz autonomous territory. Those local
leaders demand a status equivalent to Transnistrias within Moldova,
should it come to reunification under Russias auspices. On September
22 the Gagauz territorys legislative assembly narrowly approved a
resolution recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and praising Russias
recent actions in Georgia (Basapres, September 22, 23).
Chisinau easily concedes to Russias demand that Moldova should remain
permanently neutral, assuming that this implies maintaining a clear
distance from NATO. Indeed neither Moldova nor NATO can see valid
reasons for Moldovan membership in the alliance in any foreseeable
future. Russian representatives, however, told Moldovans in recent
contacts that the European Union was not merely an economic and
political union, but also potentially a political-military bloc, and
that Moldovas goal of accession to the EU would be incompatible with
Moldovas neutrality.
Within the moribund 5+2 format, and despite its agony, all sides say
that it remains the only legitimate forum for negotiation and decision.
But they attach differing meanings to this phrase. The Western
representatives, Ukraine, and Moldova take the position that only the
5+2 format can produce a legitimate outcome. Russia takes the position
that any format, including 1+2, can be considered legitimate if it
produces a solution mutually acceptable to the parties” (Moldova and
Russia/Transnistria), i.e., if Moldova is cajoled or pressured into it.
At the same time, Russia and, again, Moldova consider it possible to
reach a political settlement directly in the 1+2 format and then refer
it afterward to the 5+2 format for Western blessings (perhaps with
minor editing) there.
Chisinau seems caught between these two interpretations at the moment.
It is pressed for time and has lost its earlier confidence in a
Western-delivered solution.
The United States and EU recommend patience and postponement of a
solution until a more favorable context develops, both internationally
and locally. In the aftermath of Russias war on Georgia, however, it
seems difficult to persuade Chisinau that a favorable context can be
created any time soon. And it seems correspondingly difficult for
Chisinau to avoid the temptation of the Moscow-laid, 2+1 trap.
More than a decade ago, Moldovas then-presidents Mircea Snegur and
Petru Lucinschi embarked on appeasement of Russia in Transnistria after
seeing the West leaving Georgia face-to-face with Russia in Abkhazia.
As Snegur told this author at the time, If [Georgian] President
Shevardnadze with all his great diplomacy was not helped to retrieve
Abkhazia, what can a Moldovan president do about Transnistria?
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=427&issue_id=4633&article_id=2373399
