Analyses

The partnership was launched on May 7 in Prague to lackluster reviews as several key European leaders -- most notably Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Silvio Berlusconi -- failed to show up. Many who did come crossed their fingers that a notorious invitee, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, would stay far away. As it turns out, the Belarusian leader didnt make it and neither did then- (and still-) acting Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin.

On May 20, the Moldovan opposition passed its first real test of unity when it effectively boycotted the session of the new Parliament -- elected in the controversial polls of April 5 -- that was convened to choose the country's next president. Rapid-fire, there will be another, possibly decisive vote for president, and Vladimir Voronin, the Communist Party head, Parliament speaker, and acting president, called it for May 28.

European Union policy toward its neighbours to the east is in trouble, despite the launch of its new Eastern Partnership. European public opinion is increasingly introspective and sporadically protectionist. So what is to be done about the "grey zone" to Europe's east -- the six countries that now lie between the EU and Russia? Inaction is unacceptable. The region has been badly hit by the economic crisis, made all the worse by internal political turmoil and serious security dangers.

"With Moldova's horde of guest workers heading home, the effects of global recession will hit Europe's poorest country hard. This crisis could be used to unlock its frozen conflict with Transnistria", comments Louis O'Neill

The recent government crackdown in Moldova on violent protests against allegations of electoral fraud during the April 5 parliamentary vote brings to mind Eric Weiner's "The Geography of Bliss." The author's year-long search for the world's happiest place led him to the conclusion that Moldovans must be the most unhappy people. Without an "abiding faith or culture on which to rely," Mr. Weiner wrote, Moldovans harbor a superstitious world-view that is "free-floating, anchored to nothing but the cloud of pessimism that hovers over this sad land."

For the first time in recent memory, the heavy hitters of international election monitoring -- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament -- were in agreement with Russia-led observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States: Moldovan parliamentary elections on Sunday were run more or less in accordance with accepted norms. Nonetheless, provocateur-instigated violence and vandalism broke out in Chisinau following massive, peaceful and spontaneous opposition protests.

The European Union is the only political actor with the credibility to find a solution to the current crisis When a crowd of demonstrators stormed Moldova's presidential palace and parliament building this week, many in the west struggled to understand what was happening there. Was it a new Ukraine-style "colour revolution", or a Latvia-style riot sparked by the economic crisis? The truth is it's neither.

Moldova is the latest country in Europe to collapse into crisis after a contested election. Some 15.000 people, communicating through web-sites like ‘Twitter, took to the street to protest against unfair elections taking control of the Parliament and Presidential Palace. The protests follow on from Georgias Rose revolution in 2004, Ukraines Orange Revolution in 2005, and the killing of ten protestors against election fraud in Armenia in March 2008.

Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin has pulled back at the last moment from the brink of a separate deal to put Russia in the driving seat of negotiations on Transnistria. The March 18 joint declaration by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Voronin, and Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov triggered that process. A meeting of Voronin and Smirnov in Tiraspol on March 25 was scheduled as next in the sequence, potentially leading to the presentation of a fait accompli by Moscow to the Western negotiators in the 5+2 format.

The joint declaration by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, and Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov, signed in Moscow on March 18 (EDM, March 20, 25, 26), is serving Smirnov well as a negotiation-breaker. Citing points in that declaration, Smirnov is now calling openly for marginalizing or bypassing Western participants in the negotiating process, which Moscow and Tiraspol -or the latter fronting for the former- had already brought to a deadlock.

Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin's signature on the March 18 Moscow declaration, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Transnistria's leader Igor Smirnov (Interfax, Russian MFA website, March 18, 19; see EDM, March 20, 25), amounts to a surrender in the final days of Voronin's presidency. This political document has solidified Russia's military presence and increased Russia's scope for influencing Moldova's policy choices through manipulation of the Transnistria conflict. These are the short-term effects and may extend beyond the short term unless a post-Voronin government disavows this move.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's March 18 meeting with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov (see EDM, March 20) was designed to mark a qualitatively new stage in the long-running negotiations on the Transnistria conflict. While continuing to block the conflict resolution negotiations, Russia is trying to move the process toward a formula to guarantee Russian control of this part of Moldova, with troops in place. Moldova's general elections, which are scheduled for April 5, give the Kremlin leverage to pressure Voronin into accepting Russia's terms.

Since Transnistria broke away, Moldovan governments have tried to reach a settlement, first with Tiraspol and then directly with Moscow, to find a possible path towards conflict resolution. The problem is that neither path proved to be possible. After the war in Georgia some Western observers wondered whether Russia shouldnt now be willing to send a signal of goodwill and cooperation by resolving the Transnistrian conflict. In fact, the reaction of foreign investors alone showed how economically dependent Russia still is, and that confrontation and isolation damages the trust Russia needs to foster its own development. How isolated Russia has become was demonstrated by the fact that even its closest allies refused to follow its lead in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The leaders of Moldova and its separatist Transdniester region have agreed to jump-start efforts to resolve their decades-long dispute through a combination of bilateral contacts and international mediation. A Kremlin-brokered meeting in Moscow on March 18 was only the second direct contact between Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov in almost eight years.

With just six weeks to go before the April 5 parliamentary elections, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Moldova on February 23-24, his first visit to that country since taking office in March 2004. The timing of his visit fueled speculation that its real purpose was to underscore Moscow's support for the ruling Communist Party, which is seeking a third successive term in office.

On February 24 and 25, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov undertook a landmark visit to Moldova, in preparation for a possible meeting among Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, and Transnistria's Moscow-installed leader Igor Smirnov next month. The ostensible goal is to jump-start a solution to the Transnistria conflict (Moldpress, Interfax, February 24-26).

In the course of my two terms as Head of the OSCE Mission in Chisinau I witnessed almost seven years of talks, contacts, walkouts, crises, recriminations, and renewals of the political settlement negotiations. Looking back and ruminating on my rather lengthy involvement in the process, I come to the following observations about both the Moldova-Transdniestria political settlement process, and negotiation and mediation in general.

The Ukraine-Russia gas crisis has ended, and one might think everyone has returned to business as usual. But after Ukraine, the next item of business is Moldova. Russia, as both European Union and U.S. officials recall, has used gas for political leverage on previous occasions,

Summary: The ENP has given a new more dynamic impetus to Moldovas relations with the EU. In the last years, the presence and influence of the EU in Moldova has increased remarkably, the Moldova și EU political cooperation has become more active, broader and deeper,