Analyses

The EU has an almost annual ritual of mending its often-criticised policy towards its eastern neighbours - the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) -- through various upgrades such as the ‘New Ostpolitik', the ENP Plus, enhanced ENP, Black Sea Synergy and, most recently, the Eastern

Russia and Moldova are exploring a possible settlement of the Transnistria conflict on a bilateral basis, outside the international 5 + 2 format. Russia is the initiator of this approach, pulling a reluctant but still hopeful Moldova along. The Russian-desired outcome would: reunify Moldova nominally, albeit under Russian oversight; show that Russia can single-handedly settle a frozen” conflict in Europes East, marginalizing the Euro-Atlantic community in the EUs own neighborhood; and demonstrate that countries such as Moldova that do not seek to join NATO can hope for a more lenient Russian treatment, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, which Russia threatens to dismember or partition if they progress toward NATO membership.

Recently, the EU has learned that a war over an obscure place such as South Ossetia can shatter the arrangements of post-Cold War Europe. The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia has reverberated even more shockingly across the post-Soviet space. Without stronger engagement with its neighbours, the EU might end up with a bi-polar Europe, not a "ring of friends" in its neighbourhood.

Representatives of all parties involved in the Transdniester settlement process gathered in Moldova for informal discussions on July 21-23. First, the 3+2 format și the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine, as mediators, and the European Union and the United States, as observers -- held separate meetings with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transdniester "vice president" Aleksandr Korolyov. The region's de facto president, Igor Smirnov, demonstratively chose not to attend.Then the same group participated in a meeting of the heads of joint expert groups for socioeconomic issues set up between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Finally, informal consultations were held within the complete 5+2 format, including the Moldovan and Transdniester chief negotiators focusing exclusively on proposals for advancing confidence-building measures between the two sides.

Under Parallel Actions, NATO would accept a promise of Russian troop withdrawal from Moldova in lieu of actual withdrawal. It only speaks of withdrawal of ammunition (not troops) when possible,” without a time-table and implying through that wording that the withdrawal might be conditional (although the 1999 documents had eliminated any conditionality). The proposal allows Russia to retain peacekeeping” troops in Moldova as part of an internationalized operation; but Russia can be expected to stonewall any such internationalization, undoubtedly cite the lack of agreement on it as an excuse for keeping its troops in Moldova.

August 6, 2007 (Info-prim.md)By Andrei Popov,Executive Director, Foreign Policy Associationof Moldova (APE)At a press conference on July 25th President Vladimir Voronin spoke in ratheroptimistic terms about the possibility of liberalising visa regime with the...